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Abstract
Although many formalisms for reasoning about action exist, surprisingly few approaches have
taken computational complexity into consideration. The contributions of this article are the
following: a temporal logic with a restriction for which deciding satisfiability is tractable, a tractable
extension for reasoning about action, and NP-completeness results for the unrestricted problems.
Many interesting reasoning problems can be modelled, involving nondeterminism, concurrency and
memory of actions. The reasoning process is proved to be sound and complete. Ó 1999 Published
by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Although many formalisms for reasoning about action exist, surprisingly few approaches
have taken computational complexity into consideration. One explanation for this might
be that many interesting AI problems are (at least) NP-hard, and that tractable subprob-
lems that are easily extracted, tend to lack expressiveness. This has led a large part of the
AI community to rely on heuristics and incomplete systems to solve the problems (see,
for example, [7] for a discussion). This holds, in particular, for the area of reasoning about
action, where the very expressive logical formalisms provide difficult obstacles when it
comes to efficient implementation.
We feel, however, that the tractability boundary for sound and complete reasoning about
action has not yet been satisfactorily investigated. We prove this by introducing a nontriv-
ial subset of a logic with semantics closely related to the trajectory semantics of Sande-
wall [14], for which satisfiability is tractable. Our logic can handle examples involving not
∗ Corresponding author. Present address: Ruddammsvägen 17, S-114 21 Stockholm, Sweden. Email: thomas@
fjuk.org.
1 Email: marbj@ida.liu.se.
0004-3702/99/$ – see front matter Ó 1999 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0004-3702(99)0 00 65 -X
2 T. Drakengren, M. Bjäreland / Artificial Intelligence 115 (1999) 1–24
only nondeterminism, but continuous time, concurrency and memory of actions as well,
thus providing a conceptual extension of Sandewall’s framework. The reader should note
that our main concern is computation, as opposed to modelling. We claim that this is pos-
sible due to the recent years of development within the area of reasoning about action;
it appears to be generally accepted that the frame problem (the main modelling obstacle
in the area) is solved under the following precise assumptions (see Sandewall [14] for a
thorough investigation of correctness analyses of logics with respect to such assumptions,
and Haugh [11] for a general discussion about assumptions related to the frame prob-
lem):
• Actions always succeed. This is the action omniscience assumption.
• Feature values change if and only if an action explicitly changes them. This is the
assumption of strict inertia.
The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 is an informal overview of the technical
results, where two examples are also presented. In Section 3 we present the syntax and
semantics of the basic temporal logic and the extension for reasoning about action, and in
Section 4, we present the following: three intractability results for these formalisms, and
the main results: the tractable subclasses of the temporal logic and its extension.
This article is an extended version of an earlier conference paper [3]. The main differ-
ences are that in this version all proofs are included, the coNP-completeness results that
are consequences of the NP-completeness results therein have been established, and the
presentation has been improved and extended with more examples of the various construc-
tions.
2. Overview
In Section 3 we develop a temporal logic, Λ, which is syntactically related to the
propositional temporal logic TPTL [1]. The temporal domain is the set of real numbers and
temporal expressions are based on relations=,6,<,> and> between linear polynomials
with rational coefficients over a set of temporal variables. The semantics of this temporal
logic is standard. The formalism for reasoning about action is narrative based, which
means that scenario descriptions are used to model the real world. Scenario descriptions
consist of formulae in the temporal logic (observations) and action expressions which are
constructs that state that certain changes in values of the features (propositions, fluents)
may occur. We write action expressions as pi V [α]εInfl, where pi is the precondition
for the action, ε the effects, α a temporal expression denoting when the effects are taking
place, and Infl is the set of all features that are influenced by the action. The influenced
features are not subject to the assumption of inertia, i.e., we allow them, and only them, to
change during the execution of the action.
It turns out that deciding satisfiability is NP-complete, both for the temporal logic and the
scenario descriptions. Interestingly, the problem is NP-complete for scenario descriptions
that only include Horn clause observations, unconditional and unary action expressions
(this terminology is explained later), and no stated relations between temporal expressions.
As a consequence of the NP-completeness results, we easily obtain coNP-completeness
for the entailment problems.
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To extract a tractable subset from our formalism we rely on a recent result in temporal
constraint reasoning by Jonsson and Bäckström [12] (also discovered independently by
Koubarakis [13]). They have identified a large tractable class of temporal constraint
reasoning, using Horn Disjunctive Linear Relations (Horn DLRs) which are relations
between linear polynomials with rational coefficients. We make use of their result by
restricting formulae in our scenario descriptions to be Horn and then by encoding scenario
descriptions into Horn DLRs. For the temporal logic this is fairly straightforward. For the
scenario descriptions, it turns out that we have to put some constraints on the temporal
relations and actions in the scenario descriptions.
We will use the following two examples: Jump into a Lake with a Hat [8] and Soup Bowl
Lifting [6]. Below we informally describe the examples.
Example 2.1 (Jump into a Lake with a Hat, JLH). If you jump into the lake you will get
wet. If you have been in the water at some time point it is unclear if you still have your hat
on. This is an example of nondeterminism and of memory of actions.
Example 2.2 (Soup Bowl Lifting, SBL). If we lift either side of a soup bowl at some time
points, the content will be spilled, unless we lift both sides at the same time point. This is
an example of concurrency.
The first example can be handled by the tractable subset of our formalism, whereas the
second one fails to satisfy the restrictions. Note that actions may partly overlap.
3. Scenario descriptions
We introduce a semantics that is a simpler variant of Sandewall’s Features and Fluents
Framework [14], in that the effects of an action can only occur at one and the same time
point for a given action, and we use only propositional values of features (similar to the
work of Doherty [2]). However, in some respects this formalism is more flexible than
Sandewall’s: we use a continuous time domain, we allow concurrently executing actions,
and effects of actions can depend on other states in the history than the state at the starting
time point of the action (this implies memory of actions, in Sandewall’s [14] terminology).
One example of a formalism having memory is that of Gustafsson and Doherty [10].
Initially, a basic temporal logic is defined. The computational properties of this logic will
be exploited by the scenario description logic, i.e., ultimately (in Section 4) the scenario
descriptions will be transformed into formulae of the basic temporal logic.
3.1. Syntax
We begin by defining the basic temporal logic.
We assume that we have a set T of time point variables intended to take real values, and
a set F of features intended to take propositional values.
Definition 3.1. A signature is a tuple σ = 〈T ,F〉, where T is a finite set of time point
variables and F is a finite set of propositional features. A time point expression is a linear
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polynomial over T with rational coefficients. We denote the set of time point expressions
over T by T ∗.
Definition 3.2. Let σ = 〈T ,F〉 be a signature, let α,β ∈ T ∗, f ∈F ,R ∈ {=,6,<,>,>},
⊕∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}, and define the scenario description languageΛ over σ by
Λ ::= T | F | f | αRβ | ¬Λ | Λ1 ⊕Λ2 | [α]Λ.
A formula of the form αRβ is a linear relation, and one that does not contain any
connectives (any of the constructs ∧,∨,→,↔,¬ and [·]) is atomic. If γ is atomic and
α ∈ T ∗, then the formulae γ , [α]γ , ¬γ , [α]¬γ and ¬[α]γ are literals. 2 (A formula
[α]γ expresses that at time α, γ is true.) A literal l is negative iff it contains ¬ and its
corresponding atomic formula γ is not of the form αRβ for R ∈ {<,6,>,>}. A literal
that is not negative is positive. Disjunctions of literals are clauses. A formula γ ∈Λ is in
conjunctive normal form, CNF, iff it is a conjunction of clauses. A formula γ is Horn iff it
is a clause with at most one positive literal. A set Γ of formulae is Horn iff every γ ∈ Γ
is Horn. Syntactical identity between formulae is written ≡, and when ambiguity is to be
avoided, we denote formulae γ ∈Λ by pγ q.
Let γ be a formula. A feature f ∈F occurs free in γ iff it does not occur within the scope
of a [α] expression in γ . α ∈ T ∗ binds f in γ if a formula [α]φ occurs as a subformula of
γ , and f is free in φ. If no feature occurs free in γ , γ is closed. If γ does not contain any
occurrence of [α] for any α ∈ T ∗, then γ is propositional.
We will blur the distinction between Horn formulae and conjunctions of Horn formulae;
everything in the paper that works for Horn formulae works also for conjunctions of Horn
formulae: such a formula can always be split into a set of Horn formulae.
For JHL, for instance, we have two observations: [0]hat_on∧dry∧on_land that denotes
that, initially, the hat is on, the person is dry and not in the water, and c1 > 0 ∧ c1 6 c2.
Note that both the observations are Horn.
Using Λ, we can thus express propositions being true at time points, and express
relations between time points. Next we define the extension of the basic temporal logic
by introducing action expressions, i.e., constructs that enable modelling of change.
Definition 3.3. Let σ = 〈T ,F〉 be a signature. An action expression over σ is a tuple
A= 〈α,pi,Infl, ε〉, α ∈ T ∗, pi a closed formula in Λ, Infl⊆ F , and ε a propositional
formula, where all features occurring in ε are in Infl. α is the result time point of A, pi
is the precondition of A, Infl is the set of influenced features of A, and ε is the effects of
A. A is unconditional iff pi ≡ T, and unary iff |Infl| = 1.
For convenience we write action expressions as
pi V [α]εInfl;
for example, we have
[3]loadedV [4]¬alive{alive}
2 So, the formula ¬[α]¬γ is not a literal.
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for an action shoot. If pi ≡ T, we remove it and theV symbol, and if ε ≡ T, we remove it.
An example is an unconditional loading action
[2]loaded{loaded},
and the action of spinning the chamber of a gun
[3]{loaded}.
An observation over σ is a closed formula in Λ.
It might be of interest to note that we do not confine the actions to be “Markovian”,
i.e., that they depend only on the state in which they are performed. They may depend on
multiple states in the past, or even on states in the future (even if it is quite unlikely that
that would occur in a real-world scenario).
Next, we combine the concepts defined so far into one.
Definition 3.4. A scenario description is a tuple
Υ = 〈σ, SCD,OBS〉,
where σ = 〈T ,F〉 is a signature, SCD (the schedule) is a finite set of action expressions
over σ , and OBS is a finite set of observations over σ . The size of a scenario description is
defined as the sum of lengths of all formulae in SCD and OBS.
Now, we formalise the examples from Section 2.
Example 3.5 (JLH). The intended conclusion of the following scenario is that the person
is wet at time c1, and we do not know if the hat is on at time point c2, occurring after the
person jumps.
OBS1 [0]hat_on∧ dry∧ on_land
SCD1 [c1]¬on_land{on_land}
SCD2 [c1]¬on_landV [c1]¬dry{dry}
SCD3 [c1]¬on_landV [c2]{hat_on}
OBS4 c1 > 0∧ c2 > c1.
Example 3.6 (SBL). We have two actions: one for lifting the left side of the soup bowl and
one for lifting the right side. If the actions are not executed simultaneously, the table cloth
will no longer be dry. The intended conclusion here is c2 = c1.
OBS1 [0]dry
SCD1 [c1]leftup{leftup}
SCD2 [c1]¬rightupV [c1]¬dry{dry}
SCD3 [c2]rightup{rightup}
SCD4 [c2]¬leftupV [c2]¬dry{dry}
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OBS2 [c2]dry
OBS3 c2 > 0∧ c1 > 0.
3.2. Semantics
For the presentation of the semantics we proceed similarly to the presentation of the
syntax. We begin by defining the semantics of the basic temporal logic.
Definition 3.7. Let σ = 〈T ,F〉 be a signature. A state over σ is a function from F to
the set {T,F} of truth values. A history over σ is a function h from R to the set of
states. A valuation φ is a function from T to R. It is extended in a natural way (as a
homomorphism from T ∗ to R), giving, e.g.,
φ(3t + 4.3)= 3φ(t)+ 4.3.
A development, or interpretation, over σ is a tuple 〈h,φ〉 where h is a history and φ is a
valuation.
Definition 3.8. Let γ ∈Λ, and let D = 〈h,φ〉 be a development. Define the truth value of
γ in D for a time point t ∈ R, denoted D(γ, t), as follows (here we overload T and F to
denote both formulae and truth values). Assume f ∈ F , R ∈ {=,6,<,>,>}, α,β ∈ T ∗,
γ, δ ∈Λ, ⊕∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}, and τ ∈ {T,F}. Now define
D(τ, t) = τ
D(f, t) = h(t)(f )
D(αRβ, t) = φ(α)Rφ(β)
D(¬γ, t) = ¬D(γ, t)
D(γ ⊕ δ, t) = D(γ, t)⊕D(δ, t)
D([α]γ, t) = D(γ,φ(α)).
Two formulae γ1 and γ2 are equivalent iffD(γ1, t)=D(γ2, t) for allD and t . A set Γ ⊆Λ
of formulae is satisfiable iff there exists a developmentD and a time point t ∈R such that
D(γ, t) is true for every γ ∈ Γ . A development D is a model of a set Γ ⊆ Λ of closed
formulae iff D(γ, t) is true for every t ∈ R and γ ∈ Γ . A formula γ ∈Λ is entailed by a
set Γ ⊆Λ of formulae, denoted Γ |= γ , iff γ is true in all models of Γ .
Two simple facts follow.
Fact 3.9. For γ ∈Λ and α ∈ T ∗, ¬[α]γ is equivalent to [α]¬γ . For a closed formula γ ,
D(γ, t)=D(γ, t ′) for any t, t ′ ∈R and developmentD.
Thus, if γ is closed, we can write D(γ ) instead of D(γ, t).
Fact 3.10. If Γ ⊆Λ is a set of formulae and γ ∈Λ a formula, then Γ |= γ iff Γ ∪ {¬γ }
is unsatisfiable.
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Now we define the semantics of the action expressions based on models for the basic
temporal logic. Inertia (the frame problem) is handled by identifying all time points where
a feature f possibly can change its value. Then during every interval where no such change
time point exists, f has to have the same value throughout the interval.
Definition 3.11. Let D = 〈h,φ〉 be a development. An action expression A = 〈α,pi ,
Infl, ε〉 has effects inD iffD(pi)= T. Let f ∈F , and define Chg(D, SCD, f, t) to be true
for a time point t ∈R iff f ∈ Infl for some action expressionA= 〈α,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD
that has effects inD, with φ(α)= t . Note that we can only have Chg(D, SCD, f, t) true for
a finite number of time points for fixed SCD and f .
Let Υ = 〈σ, SCD,OBS〉 be a scenario description. An intended model of Υ is a
developmentD = 〈h,φ〉 where
• D is a model of OBS.
• For each A= 〈α,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD that has effects in D, D(ε,φ(α))= T.
• For each f ∈ F and s, t ∈ R with s < t such that for no t ′ ∈ (s, t) (open interval),
Chg(D, SCD, f, t ′) holds, we have h(t ′)(f )= h(s)(f ) for every t ′ ∈ (s, t). Intuitively,
this definition insures that no change in the value of a feature occurs in an interval if
no action explicitly changes it.
Denote by Mod(Υ ) the set of all intended models for a scenario description Υ .
A formula γ ∈Λ is entailed by a scenario description Υ , denoted Υ |= γ , iff γ is true
in all intended models of Υ . Υ is satisfiable iff Mod(Υ ) 6= ∅.
Fact 3.12. If Υ = 〈σ, SCD,OBS〉 is a scenario description and γ ∈ Λ a formula, then
Υ |= γ iff 〈σ, SCD,OBS ∪ {¬γ }〉 is unsatisfiable.
We comment how this is used in our two examples:
• For JHL we can note that every intended model D = 〈h,φ〉 has the following
properties:
(1) h(φ(0))(hat_on) = T, h(φ(0))(dry) = T, and h(φ(0))(on_land) = T, due to
OBS1.
(2) φ(c1)> φ(0) and φ(c2)> φ(c1), due to OBS4.
(3) Since all actions have effect we can note, e.g., thatD(dry, φ(c1))= F, since SCD1
sets dry to F.
(4) Since D is an intended model of JHL, we know that all three actions have effects
in D. Thus, the following Chg extensions are true:
• Chg(D, SCD,on_land, φ(c1)) due to SCD1,
• Chg(D, SCD,dry, φ(c1)) due to SCD2, and
• Chg(D, SCD,hat_on, φ(c2)) due to SCD2.
Intuitively, all features are allowed to change iff they are influenced by an action.
Property (3) ensures that if we add the observation [c1]dry the scenario would be
unsatisfiable. So JHL entails [c1]¬dry. On the other hand, if we instead would add
[c2]hat_on or [c2]¬hat_on to the scenario we would not get unsatisfiability, since
SCD3 splits the set of models into those where [c2]hat_on is true, and those where it
is not. Thus, neither of the expressions are logical consequences of the scenario.
• For SBL, adding c2 6= c1 as an observation will make the scenario unsatisfiable.
8 T. Drakengren, M. Bjäreland / Artificial Intelligence 115 (1999) 1–24
4. Complexity results
4.1. Basic results
It is no surprise that deciding satisfiability for the basic temporal logic is NP-hard. Proofs
of NP-completeness, on the other hand, depend on the tractability results.
Proposition 4.1. Deciding satisfiability of a set Γ ⊆Λ is NP-hard.
Proof. Propositional logic is a subset of Λ. 2
Corollary 4.2. Deciding whether a scenario description is satisfiable is NP-hard.
That these problems are in NP, and thus are NP-complete, is proved in Theorem 4.9 and
Theorem 4.10.
Interestingly, we can strengthen the result considerably.
Theorem 4.3. Deciding whether a scenario description is satisfiable is NP-hard, even if
action expressions are unconditional and unary, only Horn observations are allowed, and
no disjunctive relations between time points may be stated.
Proof. Reduction from 3SAT. Let Ci = li1 ∨ li2 ∨ li3 be the clauses of a 3CNF formula φ,
and v the set of propositional symbols used in φ. We construct a scenario description Υ
satisfying the required restrictions as follows. Set
F = v ∪ {p′ | p ∈ v},
T = {s, t} ∪ {tp | p ∈ v},
SCD = {〈t,T, {p},¬p〉 | p ∈ v} ∪ {〈t,T, {p′},p′〉 | p ∈ v},
OBS = {t > s} ∪ {[s]p, [s]¬p′ | p ∈ v}∪
{C(li1)∨ C(li2)∨ C(li3)},
where C(p)=¬[tp]p′ and C(¬p)=¬[tp]p.
We shall use intended models D as models for φ, interpreting D(tp < t) as the truth
value of p, and so show that Υ is satisfiable iff φ is satisfiable. First note the facts that in
any D ∈Mod(Υ ), D(¬[tp]p′)=D([tp]p), and that D([tp]p)=D(tp < t).
(⇒) Suppose D ∈ Mod(Υ ), and consider a clause Ci = li1 ∨ li2 ∨ li3 in φ. By the
construction of OBS, one of C(li1), C(li2) or C(li3) has to be true in D, say l = li1. If
l = p, then C(l) = ¬[tp]p′; thus D([tp]p) is true, and so is D(tp < t). If l = ¬p, then
C(l)=¬[tp]p; thus D([tp]p) is false, and so is D(tp < t).
(⇐) Suppose φ has a propositional model M , and consider a clause Ci = li1 ∨ li2 ∨ li3
in φ. Construct an intended model D of Υ by letting features have values as forced by the
scenario, t having the value 0 and s the value−1, and for each p ∈ v, if p is true inM , then
set tp =−1, and otherwise tp = 1. It is clear that the expression C(li1)∨ C(li2)∨ C(li3) is
true in D. The result follows, since it is clear that the reduction is polynomial. 2
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We now present the key to tractability, which is a linear-programming approach to
temporal constraint reasoning, by Jonsson and Bäckström [12].
Definition 4.4. Let α and β be linear polynomials with rational coefficients over some set
X of variables. Then a disjunctive linear relation, DLR, is a disjunction of one or more
expressions of the form α = β , α 6= β , α 6 β , α < β . A DLR is Horn iff it contains at most
one disjunct with the relation =, < or 6.
An assignment m of variables in X to real numbers is a model of a set Γ of DLRs iff all
formulae in Γ are true when taking the values of variables in the DLRs. A set of DLRs is
satisfiable iff it has a model.
The following result is the main result of Jonsson and Bäckström [12].
Proposition 4.5. Deciding satisfiability of a set of Horn DLRs is polynomial.
Now we restrict the scenario description language and the form of actions. Furthermore,
a structural restriction on scenario descriptions, verifiable in polynomial time, is imposed.
We shall define an encoding function that takes a Horn scenario description Υ and returns
a set Γ of Horn DLRs such that Γ is satisfiable iff Υ is satisfiable.
4.2. Satisfiability of Horn formulae is tractable
First, we code Horn formulae as Horn DLRs.
Definition 4.6. Let l be a closed literal, and assume the existence of fresh, unique time
point variables tαf for each f ∈F and α ∈ T ∗. Then C(l) is defined as follows, assuming
R ∈ {=,6,<,>,>} and f ∈F .
C(T) = p0= 0q
C(F) = p0 6= 0q
C(αRβ) = pαRβq
C(¬α = β) = pα 6= βq
C(¬α 6 β) = pα > βq
C(¬α < β) = pα > βq
C(¬α > β) = pα < βq
C(¬α > β) = pα 6 βq
C([η]αRβ) = C(αRβ)
C([α]f ) = ptαf = 0q
C(¬[α]γ ) = C([α]¬γ )
C([α]¬f ) = ptαf 6= 0q.
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Let γ ∈Λ be a closed Horn formula, and let γ ′ be obtained from γ by simplifying away
occurrences of T and F. Now γ ′ is on the form
∨
i li . Then define C(γ ) to be the DLR
δ =∨i C(li ). Note that δ is always a Horn DLR.
Let Γ ⊆Λ be a set of closed Horn formulae, and T the set of all time point expressions
occurring in Γ . Then C(Γ ) is defined by
C(Γ )= {C(γ ) | γ ∈ Γ } ∪ {C(¬[α]f ∨ β 6= α ∨ [β]f ) | f ∈F , α,β ∈ T }.
The second set is called the correspondence equations. Note that the argument of C in a
correspondence equation is equivalent to
[α]f ∧ β = α→[β]f.
The following result is crucial.
Theorem 4.7. Let Γ ⊆Λ be a set of closed Horn formulae. Then Γ is satisfiable iff C(Γ )
is satisfiable.
Proof. Let T be the set of time point expressions occurring in Γ .
(⇒) Let D = 〈h,φ〉 be a model of Γ . We shall construct a model m of C(Γ ). First
set m(t)= φ(t) for all t ∈ T . Now all temporal relations from Γ are satisfied in m, since
they are directly transferred. For each f ∈ F and α ∈ T , if h(φ(α))(f ) is true, then set
m(tαf ) = 0, otherwise set m(tαf ) = 1. It is clear that the correspondence equations are
satisfied by this definition, and so are the remaining elements of C(Γ ).
(⇐) Let m be a model of C(Γ ), Construct an interpretationD = 〈h,φ〉 as follows. First
set φ(t) = m(t) for all t ∈ T . It is enough to determine h for values φ(α), α ∈ T , since
we have no restrictions on other values. Set h(φ(α))(f ) to be true iff m(tαf )= 0. That h is
well-defined follows directly from the correspondence equations, which hold in m. 2
Corollary 4.8. Deciding satisfiability of sets of closed Horn formulae is polynomial.
Proof. It is clear that the transformation C is polynomial. The result follows from
Proposition 4.5. 2
4.3. Complexity of satisfiability and entailment
Now we have the results for the proofs of membership in NP for the satisfiability
problems of Λ and of scenario descriptions.
Theorem 4.9. Deciding satisfiability of a set Γ ⊆Λ is NP-complete.
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
Theorem 4.10. Deciding whether a scenario description is satisfiable is NP-complete.
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
We easily obtain corresponding complexity results for the problem of entailment.
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Corollary 4.11. Deciding whether Γ |= α for Γ ⊆Λ and α ∈ Γ is coNP-complete.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 4.9 and Fact 3.10, noting that Γ |= F iff
Γ is unsatisfiable. 2
Corollary 4.12. Deciding whether a formula γ ∈ Γ is entailed by a scenario description
Υ is coNP-complete.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 4.10 and Fact 3.12, noting that Υ |= F iff
Υ is unsatisfiable. 2
4.4. Tractable scenario descriptions
Using Corollary 4.8, we see that if we can code scenario descriptions into sets of Horn
formulae, we will have a polynomial algorithm for reasoning with scenario descriptions.
In order to obtain such a result, we need to restrict what scenario descriptions are allowed.
The strategy can briefly be described as follows: we identify all observation time points
which bind a feature value and all time points where an action expression possibly can
change a feature value. Then we connect bound literals with biconditionals, between time
points where the literal value should not change. For example, if some action expression
changes the value of the feature f at time point α, there exists a γ ∈ OBS which binds f
at a time point β , α < β , and no changes of the value of f occurs between α and β , then
[α]f ↔ [β]f should be added to the theory. This formula can be rewritten in Horn form.
The example represents one of the six cases (case (3)). The other cases are similar.
The restrictions are basically two: First we will have to represent action expressions as
Horn formulae (restricted action expressions). Second, the scenario descriptions must be
ordered; for example, we could not remove the restriction α < β in the example above.
Definition 4.13. Let Υ = 〈σ, SCD,OBS〉 be a scenario description. For each f ∈F , define
Ef = {α | 〈α,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD ∧ f ∈ Infl}
and
Cf = {α | α binds f in γ ∧ γ ∈O},
for
O = OBS ∪ {pi | 〈α′,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD}.
Ef is ordered iff for α,β ∈Ef , exactly one of α < β , α = β and α > β is consistent with 3
OBS. For α,β ∈ Ef , Ef ordered, we define α ≺f β iff α < β is consistent with OBS and
for every γ ∈Ef , α < γ < β is inconsistent with OBS,−∞≺f α iff for no β ∈Ef , β < α
is consistent with OBS, and α ≺f ∞ iff for no β ∈Ef , α < β is consistent with OBS.
Let α ∈ Ef , β ∈ T ∗, and define α f β iff α 6 β is consistent with OBS, α > β is
inconsistent with OBS, and for every γ ∈ Ef , α < γ 6 β is inconsistent with OBS. Also
define −∞f β iff for every α ∈Ef α 6 β is inconsistent with OBS.
3 A formula γ is consistent with a set Γ iff Γ ∪ {γ } is satisfiable.
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If for all f ∈F , Ef is ordered, and for all ω ∈ Cf , αf ω for some α ∈Ef ∪ {−∞},
then Υ is ordered. The last condition says that for each observation of a feature f , there is
a unique change of f which sets its value, or it precedes all changes of f .
For the examples JLH and SBL we have the following:
• For JLH we have
Ehat_on = {c2}, Chat_on = {0},
Edry = {c1}, Cdry = {0},
Eon_land = {c1}, Con_land = {0, c1}.
We can easily verify that JLH is ordered.
• For SBL we have
Edry = {c1, c2}, Cdry = {0, c2},
Eleftup = {c1}, Cleftup = {c2},
Erightup = {c2}, Crightup = {c1}.
SBL is not ordered, since Edry is not.
The orderedness of Υ will be required to be able to connect feature statements at
different time points by biconditionals, which are required to get a Horn theory. If an
action changes the value of a feature f at time point c and we have an observation at time
point c+ 1, e.g., [c+ 1]f , and no actions have effects between c and c+ 1, we can add the
formulae [c+ 1]f ∨¬[c]f and [c]f ∨¬[c+ 1]f to the theory. Without the total ordering
this would be impossible. This is the reason why the example SBL does not belong to the
tractable class.
Proposition 4.14. Testing whether a scenario description Υ is ordered is polynomial, if
OBS is Horn.
Proof. For the orderedness of Ef , check for each feature that all pairs of result time points
satisfy the condition. Since OBS is Horn, Corollary 4.8 guarantees that this can be done in
polynomial time. The check forf is polynomial in the same way. 2
Definition 4.15. Let A= 〈α,pi,Infl, ε〉 be an action expression. Then A is restricted iff
either of the following holds:
• pi is T and ε is a conjunction of propositional Horn formulae,
• pi is a disjunction of negative literals, and ε is either T, or a conjunction of negative
literals.
An ordered scenario description Υ = 〈σ, SCD,OBS〉 is restricted iff every action
expression in SCD is restricted and OBS is Horn. A restricted scenario description is normal
iff it is ordered, and for every action expression A ∈ SCD either of the following holds:
• pi is T and ε is a propositional Horn formula,
• pi is a negative literal and ε is either T or a negative literal.
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Of the two examples previously stated, Example 3.5 is restricted (breaking apart the
conjunction of the first observation into separate formulae), whereas Example 3.6 is not,
which is easy to verify (the second one fails to be ordered).
The following result will make the forthcoming proofs easier.
Proposition 4.16. Let Υ be a restricted scenario description. Then we can construct an
equivalent normal scenario description Υ ′ in polynomial time.
Proof. We note that a restricted action expression
A= 〈α,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD
where pi ≡∨i ¬li is equivalent to replacing it by one action expression 〈α,¬li ,Infl, ε〉
for each disjunct in pi . Similarly, a restricted action expression
A=
〈
α,pi,Infl,
∧
i
φi
〉
can be split into action expressions Ai by Ai = 〈α,pi,Infl, φi〉 (or even easier if ε ≡ T),
and obtaining the same set of intended models. The transformation is clearly polynomial.
Orderedness is preserved, since we do not change the order in which features are
changed. 2
Thus, we can assume that our restricted scenario descriptions are normal. Next, we
define the function Φ which transforms scenario descriptions into sets of Horn formulae.
Definition 4.17. First let A = 〈α,pi,Infl, ε〉 be a normal action expression. We have
three cases for Φ:
• If pi ≡ T and ε ≡∨j lj is propositional Horn, then define
Φ(A)=
{∨
j
[α]lj
}
.
• If pi ≡¬l and ε ≡ T, then define
Φ(A)= ∅.
• If pi ≡¬l and ε ≡¬m, then define
Φ(A)= {l ∨ [α]¬m}.
The restriction to normal action expressions should be clear; it implies that Φ(A) is Horn.
For a set S of action expressions, define
Φ(S)=
⋃
A∈S
Φ(A).
Let Υ = 〈σ, SCD,OBS〉 be a restricted scenario description with σ = 〈T ,F〉, and without
loss of generality, assume that each feature in F occurs in SCD or OBS. Also let b be a fresh
time point variable (b standing for “beginning”), and for each f ∈F , add a new feature f ′.
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A few construction steps (basically corresponding to the possible relations between time
points in Ef and Cf ) are necessary. We provide the intuitions behind the constructions as
we present them.
(1) Γ1 = OBS ∪Φ(SCD)∪ {b < α | α ∈Ef ∪Cf ,f ∈F}.
The observations, the transformed action expressions, and an initial time point are
added.
(2) Γ2 = {¬[α]f ∨ [b]f, [α]f ∨¬[b]f | f ∈F , α ∈Cf ,−∞f α}.
No action expression influences f before α where it is bound by an observation,
therefore f should have the same value at b as at α. Note that the members of Γ2
each are equivalent to [α]f ↔ [b]f .
(3) Γ3 = {¬[α]f ∨ [β]f, [α]f ∨¬[β]f | f ∈F , α ∈Ef ,β ∈Cf ,αf β}.
f is influenced at α and bound by an observation at a later time point β . No actions
have effects between α and β , therefore f should have the same value at β as it had
at α.
(4) Γ4 = {¬[α]f ′ ∨ [b]f, [α]f ′ ∨ ¬[b]f | f ∈F , α ∈Ef ,−∞≺f α}.
This case resembles case (2), with the difference that f is influenced at α. Therefore,
we introduce a new feature symbol f ′ which has the same value at α as f has at b.
The new symbols will be handled properly below, in case (6).
(5) Γ5 = {¬[α]f ∨ [β]f ′, [α]f ∨¬[β]f ′ | f ∈F , α,β ∈Ef ,α ≺f β}.
This relates to case (3), just as case (4) relates to case (2).
(6) Since Ef is ordered, we can form equivalence classes T αf of time points for α ∈Ef
by
T αf = {β ∈Ef | α = β is consistent with OBS}.
For each α ∈Ef , define
Pαf = {pi | 〈β,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD ∧ f ∈ Infl∧ β ∈ T αf }.
Now set
Γ6 =
{∨
Pαf ∨¬[α]f ∨ [α]f ′,
∨
Pαf ∨¬[α]f ′ ∨ [α]f | α ∈Ef
}
.
First note that this set is equivalent to the set{
¬
∨
Pαf → ([α]f ↔ [α]f ′) | α ∈Ef
}
.
Here we ensure that when actions do not have effects, f will have the same value as
it had the last time it was changed. This value is held by the feature f ′.
Now finally set
Φ(Υ )=
⋃
i
Γi .
It is clear that the transformation performed by Φ is polynomial.
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We look at the transformation of JLH. First we can note that the scenario description is
normal. For readability, we write the members of the sets as biconditionals and implications
instead of as pairs of disjunctions. The application of Φ to the actions has the following
results:
Φ(SCD1) = {[c1]¬on_land},
Φ(SCD2) = {¬[c1]on_land→[c1]¬dry},
Φ(SCD3) = ∅.
This yields
Γ1 = {[0]hat_on∧ dry∧ on_land, c1 > 0∧ c2 > c1}∪
{[c1]¬on_land,¬[c1]on_land→[c1]¬dry}∪
{b < 0, b < c1, b < c2}.
In Γ2 we assure that the feature values at time point b is the same as they are at the earliest
time point (i.e., time point 0 for all features) in the scenario.
Γ2 = {[0]hat_on↔ [b]hat_on}∪
{[0]dry↔ [b]dry}∪
{[0]on_land↔ [b]on_land}.
In Γ3 we connect feature values at time points where actions have effect with time points
where the feature values are bound by observations, and no actions have effects between
the time points. Since no such time points exist for any feature except for on_land where
the time points are c1 and c1 we get a set with one tautology.
Γ3 = {[c1]on_land↔ [c1]on_land}.
In Γ4 we prepare for inertia. We connect feature values at b with the first time points where
features may be affected by actions, so that if the preconditions of the actions are false, the
feature values at b persist throughout the action.
Γ4 = {[c2]hat_on′ ↔ [b]hat_on}∪
{[c1]dry′ ↔ [b]dry}∪
{[c1]on_land′ ↔ [b]on_land}.
Since for all features f in JLH Ef are singleton sets, Γ5 is empty.
For Γ6 we note that there will only be three sets T αf and three sets Pαf since all three sets
Ef are singleton. Thus we get
Pc2hat_on = {[c1]¬on_land},
Pc1dry = {[c1]¬on_land},
Pc1on_land = {T}.
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We can now compute Γ6.
Γ6 = {¬[c1]¬on_land→ ([c2]hat_on↔[c2]hat_on′)}∪
{¬[c1]¬on_land→ ([c1]dry↔ [c1]dry′)}.
It is clear that an encoding to Horn DLRs can be made from this transformation. The
following two theorems validate such an encoding.
Theorem 4.18. Let Υ be a restricted scenario description, and set Γ = C(Φ(Υ )). Then
Υ is satisfiable iff Γ is satisfiable.
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
Theorem 4.19. Deciding satisfiability (and entailment) for restricted scenario descrip-
tions is polynomial.
5. Discussion
One piece of related work is the approach by Schwalb et al. [15] to reasoning about
propositions being true at time points. Their choice for obtaining an algorithm is to code
both propositions and temporal relations into propositional logic, whereas we do the
opposite. However, their tractable inference algorithm is not complete, and they define
no measure on when the correct inferences will be obtained, so it is very difficult to relate
it to our approach. Furthermore they cannot handle inertia adequately: there, propositions
may always change when actions are performed, but certainly this is undesirable if actions
which do not affect all features are used.
In this article our concern has been computational complexity for reasoning about action.
It is important to note that although we have provided polynomial algorithms for the
reasoning tasks, these can hardly be considered efficient. The important results, however,
are that there exist polynomial algorithms; the next obvious step is to also make them
fast. For efficient implementation, there is one direction we are particularly interested in
investigating: since the technique used for achieving tractability can be described as an
encoding of our logic as temporal constraints for which there is a tractable algorithm for
determining satisfiability, it should be possible to do something similar for other tractable
temporal algebras, for example those identified by Drakengren and Jonsson [4,5]. Also, an
algorithm for a purely qualitative scenario description language (i.e., not involving metric
time) would probably have a faster satisfiability-checker.
We have shown that satisfiability of scenario descriptions is NP-complete within our
formalism. We feel that it would be a mistake to interpret this negatively. On the contrary,
one could argue (in lines with [9]) that this would imply that many approximations,
powerful heuristics and nontrivial tractable subsets of problems for reasoning about action
remain to be found. This article is a step on the way in this endeavour.
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6. Conclusions
We have presented a temporal logic and an extension for reasoning about action
from which tractable subsets have been extracted. This has been done with an encoding
of the logic to Horn DLRs, a recent tractable framework from the field of temporal
constraint reasoning. The formalism is narrative based with continuous time, and the
world is modelled with scenario descriptions consisting of action expressions and
observations. It is possible to model nondeterminism, concurrency and memory of actions.
Time is represented using linear polynomials with rational coefficients over real valued
variables.
Appendix A
Here, the more complicated proofs are collected.
First, we need some auxiliary concepts.
Definition A.1. Let Γ ⊆Λ. Then we define ¬Γ = {¬γ | γ ∈ Γ }, feat(Γ ) to be the set of
all features occurring in Γ , linrel(Γ ) to be the set of all linear relations (which are atomic
formulae) occurring in Γ , and time(Γ ) to be the set of all time point expressions occurring
in Γ .
Theorem 4.9. Deciding satisfiability of a set Γ ⊆Λ is NP-complete.
Proof. By Proposition 4.1, it remains to prove that the problem is in NP. Let Γ ⊆Λ be a
set of formulae. A few auxiliary definitions will be needed for the proof.
Let F = feat(Γ ), L= linrel(Γ ), T = time(Γ ), let t be a fresh time point variable, set
A+ = {[α]f | α ∈ T ∪ {t} ∧ f ∈ F } ∪L,
and
A′ =A+ ∪¬A+.
We say that a set W ⊆A′ is a syntactic Λ-interpretation iff for any φ ∈A+, exactly one of
φ and ¬φ is a member of W .
Next, we define a way to evaluate a formula γ ∈ Λ in a syntactic Λ-interpretation,
following Definition 3.8. Let γ ∈ Λ. We define the truth value of γ in W for α′ ∈ T ∗,
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denoted W(γ,α′), as follows. Assume f ∈ F , R ∈ {=,6,<,>,>}, α,β ∈ T ∗, γ, δ ∈Λ,
and ⊕∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}.
W(T, α′) = T
W(F, α′) = F
W(f,α′) = (p[α′]f q ∈W)
W(αRβ,α′) = (pαRβq ∈W)
W(¬γ,α′) = ¬W(γ,α′)
W(γ ⊕ δ,α′) = W(γ,α′)⊕W(δ,α′)
W([α]γ,α′) = W(γ,α).
It is clear that W(γ,α′) is always defined for γ ∈ Λ. Thus we can say that a syntactic
Λ-interpretationW is a syntactic Λ-model of a set Γ of formulae iff W is satisfiable, and
for all γ ∈ Γ , W(γ, t) is true.
If we can prove that whenever Γ is satisfiable, then there exists a syntactic Λ-model W
of Γ , and vice versa, then NP-membership will follow, since
• the size of W is polynomial in the size of Γ ,
• it can be checked in polynomial time whether W is a syntactic Λ-interpretation or
not,
• W(γ,α′) can easily be computed in polynomial time,
• by Corollary 4.8, checking satisfiability of a set of closed Horn formulae is
polynomial, and thus checking satisfiability of W is polynomial.
(⇒) Suppose that Γ is satisfiable, i.e., that for some t ∈ R, I (γ, t) = T for all γ ∈ Γ .
Construct a syntactic Λ-interpretation W from I = 〈h,φ〉 by first setting I ′ = 〈h,φ′〉,
where φ′(s)= φ(s) for all s ∈ T − {t}, and φ′(t)= t , and then defining
W = {δ ∈A′ | I ′(δ)= T}.
It remains to check that W is satisfiable, and that W(γ, t)= T for all γ ∈ Γ .
W is trivially satisfiable, since by construction I ′ is a model ofW . We prove by induction
on γ that W(γ,α′)= I (γ,φ′(α′)) for all γ ∈Λ and α′ ∈ T ∪ {t}; thus W(γ, t)= T for all
γ ∈ Γ .
First, the basis cases: If γ ≡ T or γ ≡ F, the result is immediate. If γ ≡ f for f ∈ F ,
then
W(γ,α′) = W(f,α′)
= (p[α′]f q ∈W)
= I ′([α′]f )
= I (f,φ′(α′)).
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If γ ≡ αRβ for α,β ∈ T ∗ and R ∈ {=,6,<,>,>}, then
W(γ,α′) = W(αRβ,α′)
= (pαRβq ∈W)
= I ′(αRβ,φ′(α′)).
Now, the induction: If γ ≡¬δ, then
W(γ,α′) = W(¬δ,α′)
= ¬W(δ,α′)
= ¬I (δ,φ′(α′)) induction
= I (¬δ,φ′(α′)).
If γ ≡ δ1⊕ δ2 for ⊕∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}, then
W(γ,α′) = W(δ1 ⊕ δ2, α′)
= W(δ1, α′)⊕W(δ2, α′)
= I (δ1, φ′(α′))⊕ I (δ2, φ′(α′)) induction
= I (δ1 ⊕ δ2, φ′(α′)).
If γ ≡ [α]δ, then
W(γ,α′) = W([α]δ,α′)
= W(δ,α)
= I (δ,φ′(α)) induction
= I ([α]δ,φ′(α′)).
(⇐) Suppose that W is a syntactic Λ-model of Γ , i.e., that W is a satisfiable syntactic
Λ-interpretation, and W(γ, t) = T for all γ ∈ Γ . Let I = 〈h,φ〉 be a model of W (note
thatW contains only closed formulae). We need to show that I (γ,φ(t))= T for all γ ∈ Γ .
By induction we prove the stronger result that I (γ,φ(α′)) =W(γ,α′) for all γ ∈Λ and
α′ ∈ T ∪ {t}.
First, the basis cases: If γ ≡ T or γ ≡ F, the result is immediate. If γ ≡ f for f ∈ F ,
then
I (γ,φ(α′)) = I (f,φ(α′))
= I ([α′]f )
= (p[α′]f q ∈W)
= W(f,α′).
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If γ ≡ αRβ for α,β ∈ T ∗ and R ∈ {=,6,<,>,>}, then
I (γ,φ(α′)) = I (αRβ,φ(α′))
= (αRβ ∈W)
= W(αRβ,α′).
Now, the induction: If γ ≡¬δ, then
I (γ,φ(α′)) = I (¬δ,φ(α′))
= ¬I (δ,φ(α′))
= ¬W(δ,α′)
= W(¬δ,α′).
If γ ≡ δ1⊕ δ2 for ⊕∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}, then
I (γ,φ(α′)) = I (δ1 ⊕ δ2, φ(α′))
= I (δ1, φ(α′))⊕ I (δ2, φ(α′))
= W(δ1, α′)⊕W(δ2, α′)
= W(δ1 ⊕ δ2, α′).
If γ ≡ [α]δ, then
I (γ,φ(α′)) = I ([α]δ,φ(α′)
= I (δ,φ(α))
= W(δ,α)
= W([α]δ,α′).
Thus the result follows. 2
Theorem 4.10. Deciding whether a scenario description is satisfiable is NP-complete.
Proof. By Corollary 4.2, it remains to prove that the problem is in NP. Let Υ =
〈σ, SCD,OBS〉 be a scenario description. A few auxiliary definitions will be needed for
the proof.
Define the set ∆ of formulae by
∆= OBS ∪ {ppi→[α]εq | 〈α,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD},
let T = time(∆), F = feat(∆), L= linrel(∆), and define
∆′ = {αRβ | α,β ∈ T ∧R ∈ {=,<,>}},
A+ = {[α]f | α ∈ T ∧ f ∈ F } ∪L∪∆′,
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and
A′ =A+ ∪¬A+.
We say that a set W ⊆A′ is a syntactic scenario interpretation iff for any φ ∈A+, exactly
one of φ and ¬φ is a member of W .
By employing exactly the same method as in Theorem 4.9, we can define the truth value
in W of a formula γ ∈∆∪∆′, denoted W(γ ) (no temporal parameter is needed, since all
formulae in ∆∪∆′ are closed). Exactly as in Theorem 4.9, W satisfies the following:
• If I is a model of ∆∪∆′, and we set
W = {δ ∈A′ | I (δ)= T},
then W is a syntactic Λ-model of ∆∪∆′, and I is a model of W .
• IfW is a syntacticΛ-model of∆∪∆′ which is satisfiable by an interpretation I , then
I is a model of ∆∪∆′.
Two more auxiliary definitions are needed, for W being a syntactic scenario interpreta-
tion.
First, let α,β ∈W . Then we say that α precedes β in W , written α G β , iff α < β ∈W ,
and for no β ′ ∈ T , α < β ′ ∈ W and β ′ < β ∈ W holds. If for no α′, α′ G β , we write
−∞G β , and if for no β ′, α G β ′, we write α G∞.
Second, W is a syntactic scenario model of the scenario description Υ iff the following
holds:
• W is a syntactic Λ-model of ∆.
• For each f ∈ F and α,β ∈ T such that α G β in W , if there is no action expression
〈β,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD with f ∈ Infl for some pi , Infl and ε, then [α]f ∈W iff
[β]f ∈W .
Now, the following remains in order to prove the result of the theorem:
• If Υ is satisfiable, then there exists a syntactic scenario modelW for Υ .
• If there exist a syntactic scenario model W for Υ , then Υ is satisfiable.
This would suffice for proving NP-membership, due to the following facts:
• The size of W is polynomial in Υ .
• It can be checked in polynomial time whetherW is a syntactic Λ-model of ∆∪∆′ or
not by the same argument as in Theorem 4.9.
• Checking the second condition of the definition of syntactic scenario model is
polynomial, since we can start by sorting elements of T by the order imposed on
T by W (α comes before β iff α < β ∈W ), and then proceed with the simple checks
of SCD, which is obviously polynomial.
(⇒) Suppose that Υ is satisfiable with an intended model D = 〈h,φ〉. Now D is a
clearly a model of ∆, and we can set
W = {δ ∈A′ | D(δ)= T}.
Clearly W is a syntactic Λ-model of ∆. It remains to check the second condition in
the definition of syntactic scenario model. Take f ∈ F and α,β ∈ T satisfying the
required conditions, and suppose there is no action expression 〈β,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD
such that f ∈ Infl. By the definition of T and our assumption, we cannot have that
Chg(D, SCD, f, t ′) is true for any t ′ with D(α) < t ′ 6D(β). Since there are only finitely
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many points where Chg is true, we can choose a time point t ′′ > D(β) such that for no
s ∈ [D(β), t ′′], Chg(D, SCD, f, s) is true. Now, the definition of intended model yields
that [α]f is true iff [β]f in D, and by the definition of W , that [α]f ∈W iff [β]f ∈W .
(⇐) Suppose that W is a syntactic scenario model for Υ , which is satisfied by a
model I = 〈h,φ〉. We construct an intended model D = 〈h′, φ〉 from I as follows. For
each feature f ∈ F do the following. First for each α such that −∞ G α in W , set
h′(t)(f ) = h(φ(α))(f ) for every t 6 φ(α). Then for each α,β with α G β in W , set
h′(t)(f ) = h(φ(α))(f ) for every t such that φ(α) 6 t < φ(β). Finally, for each α such
that α G∞, set h′(t)(f )= h(φ(α))(f ) for every t > φ(α). It is clear that h′ is defined for
every f and t . It remains to verify that D is an intended model for Υ .
Since W is a syntactic scenario model for Υ , it is also a syntactic Λ-model of ∆.
By the fact that I is a model of W , and since D and I agree on the values of all time
point expressions in T , D is also a model of W , and by what we know about syntactic
Λ-interpretations, D is a model of ∆. Thus, what is left to verify is the second condition
in the definition of intended model.
For this purpose, let f be a feature and s, t ∈ R with s < t , such that for no t ′ ∈ (s, t),
Chg(D, SCD, f, t ′) holds. We want to prove that h′(t ′)(f )= h′(s)(f ) for every t ′ ∈ (s, t).
Suppose to the contrary that for some t ′ with s < t ′ < t , h′(t ′)(f ) 6= h′(s)(f ). It is easy to
see that by the construction of D from I , this cannot hold, and we have a contradiction.
ThusD is an intended model of Υ . 2
Theorem 4.18. Let Υ be a restricted scenario description, and set Γ = C(Φ(Υ )). Then
Υ is satisfiable iff Γ is satisfiable.
Proof. We start by defining a set Γ ′ which is satisfiable iff Γ is, by first defining sets Γ ′i
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,6}, giving Γ ′ =⋃16i66Γ ′i :
(1) Γ ′1 = Γ1.
(2) Γ ′2 = {[α]f ↔ [b]f | f ∈F , α ∈Cf ,−∞f α}.
(3) Γ ′3 = {[α]f ↔ [β]f | f ∈F , α ∈Ef ,β ∈ Cf ,αf β}.
(4) Γ ′4 = {[α]f ′ ↔ [b]f | f ∈F , α ∈Ef ,−∞≺f α}.
(5) Γ ′5 = {[α]f ↔ [β]f ′ | f ∈F , α,β ∈Ef ,α ≺f β}.
(6) Γ ′6 = {¬(
∨
i pii)→ ([α]f ↔ [α]f ′) | T /∈ {pii} =Pαf ,α ∈Ef }.
It is easy to see that each Γ ′i is satisfiable iff the corresponding Γi is.
(⇒) Suppose Υ is satisfiable by an intended modelD = 〈h,φ〉. We first construct a new
interpretationD′ = 〈h′, φ′〉 as follows.
• Define φ′ by setting φ′(s) = φ(s) for all s ∈ T − {b}, and φ′(b) = min{φ(α) | α ∈
T } − 1.
• For each feature f , set h′(t)(f )= h(t)(f ).
• For each feature f , introduce a new feature f ′, and define h′(t)(f ′) so that the
formulae in Γ ′4 and Γ ′5 are all true. It is clear that this is possible, since these are
essentially definitions.
We want to prove that D′ is a model of Γ . This is done by checking for every
i ∈ {1, . . . ,6}, that D′ is a model of Γ ′i .
(1) For Γ ′1, all formulae in OBS are true inD′, by definition. Furthermore, all formulae in
Φ(SCD) will be true, since these code exactly the conditions required by an intended
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model, in terms of actions. Furthermore, we have set φ′(b) to be strictly smaller than
the value of every time point expression used, so everything in the last part of Γ ′1
will be true in D′.
(2) Γ ′2 says that for each observation or action precondition involving a feature f that is
not preceded by any effect on the feature f , the value will be the same as the value
at b. Since the value of b in D′ is less than every time point expression used, this
amounts to strict inertia in each f at all time points before the first change in f . This
is clearly satisfied in D′, since it inherits this property from the intended model D.
(3) Γ ′3 says that for any feature f , observations and action precondition involving f
coming directly after changes of f with no change in between, f should retain its
value from the change. This is the same as inertia, which is clearly satisfied in any
intended model, and is inherited from D.
(4) Γ ′4 is satisfied by construction.
(5) Γ ′5 is satisfied by construction.
(6) Γ ′6 says that if none of the actions which can cause a change in f at α has a true
precondition, then f and f ′ coincide at α ∈ Ef . Since by the definitions of the
f ′ formulae, if β ∈ Ef , then f ′ is always forced to have the value at β that f
had just before it changed at β ; this just amounts to inertia, which holds for f by
construction.
(⇐) Suppose Γ is satisfiable by a model I = 〈h,φ〉. We construct an intended model
D = 〈h′, φ〉 of Υ from I as follows. Start by removing all features f ′ for features f .
Then for each feature f , do the following. First, for each α ∈ Ef such that −∞ ≺f α,
set h′(t)(f ) = h(φ(b))(f ) for each t such that t < φ(α). Then for each α,β ∈ Ef such
that α ≺f β , set h′(t)(f ) = h(φ(α))(f ) for each t such that φ(α) 6 t < φ(β). Finally,
for each α ∈ Ef such that α ≺f ∞, set h′(t)(f ) = h(φ(α))(f ) for each t > φ(α). It is
clear that h′ is defined for every t and f , and that by construction, for each f and α ∈Ef ,
h(φ(α))(f )= h′(φ(α))(f ). It remains to verify that D is an intended model of Υ .
First note that D is still a model of Γ ′1 ∪ Γ ′2 ∪ Γ ′3, since the truth of all these formulae is
preserved by the transformation from I to D. Thus, D is a model of OBS, since all values
used to evaluate the truth of formulae in OBS are identical in I and D, due to D being a
model of Γ ′2 and Γ ′3.
For the second condition of the definition of intended model, note that the set
∆= {ppi→[α]εq | 〈α,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD}
is satisfiable iff Φ(SCD) is, by construction, and that this is equivalent to the second
condition being satisfied. Thus, since I is a model of Φ(SCD), I is also a model of ∆.
It remains to check that D is also a model of ∆. Exactly as for the previous condition, the
truth values of the pi component will not change from I toD. Furthermore, by construction,
D will have the same values as I on the [α]ε expressions, since values of features f at time
points α ∈Ef are the same in D and I . Thus D is also a model of ∆.
Now the proof for the third condition. Suppose that for a feature f and time points
s, t ∈Rwith s < t , we have that for no t ′ ∈ (s, t), Chg(D, SCD, f, t ′) holds, but h′(t ′)(f ) 6=
h′(s)(f ) for some t ′ ∈ (s, t). Now, it has to hold that t ′ = φ(α′) for some α′ ∈ Ef , by the
construction of D.
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First suppose −∞ ≺f α′. By the construction of D, we have that h′(s)(f ) =
h′(φ(b))(f ), and that h′(φ(b))(f ) = h(φ(b))(f ), and thus h′(s)(f ) = h(φ(b))(f ).
Since I is a model of Γ ′4, h(φ(α′))(f ′) = h′(s)(f ); so by assumption, h(φ(α′))(f ′) 6=
h′(φ(α′))(f ), and by the construction of D, it holds that h(φ(α′))(f ′) 6= h(φ(α′))(f ).
I is a model of Γ ′6; thus ¬
∨Pα′f must be false in I , and so pi is true in I for
some 〈α′,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD with f ∈ Infl. But this means that Chg(D, SCD, f, t ′), a
contradiction.
Then suppose α ≺f α′ for some α ∈ Ef . It will suffice to find a contradiction for
s = φ(α), so we make this assumption. Now, by the construction of D, we have that
h′(φ(α))(f ) = h(φ(α))(f ), and thus h′(s)(f ) = h(φ(α))(f ). Since I is a model of Γ ′5,
h(φ(α′))(f ′) = h′(s)(f ); so by assumption, h(φ(α′))(f ′) 6= h′(φ(α′))(f ), and by the
construction of D, it holds that h(φ(α′))(f ′) 6= h(φ(α′))(f ). I is a model of Γ ′6; thus
¬∨Pα′f must be false in I , and so pi is true in I for some 〈α′,pi,Infl, ε〉 ∈ SCD with
f ∈ Infl. But this means that Chg(D, SCD, f, t ′), a contradiction. The result follows. 2
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